“The draft has never been anything but a fucking crapshoot. We take 50 guys and we celebrate if 2 of them make it. In what other business is two for fifty a success? If you did that in the stock market, you’d go broke.” – Billy Beane. (pg 17, Moneyball, Lewis)
That was Billy Beane, Oakland Athletics general manager shortly after the 2001 draft on the way players were being drafted. He was sick of seeing high school players being drafted and so few players drafted making it to the big leagues.
The reason behind all of this was because Oakland was about to lose several star players to free agency because they were not going to be able to afford them. They were going to have to change the way they drafted if they were to be a successful team, despite being poor. While the market seems to have corrected itself today, by the time the players Oakland drafted in 2002 were making it to the majors, the ideas behind this change in philosophy were critical to keeping Oakland competitive despite a low payroll.
According to Michael Lewis, author of Moneyball, Beane, was forced to find players that had been rejected under the notion of what the “model” player should be: wheels (speed), power, and a hose (strong arm), the kind of player Billy Beane was touted as coming out of high school. He had no choice if he were to stay competitive.
On-base percentage (OBP) had been undervalued, Oakland discovered. The A’s brass had begun realizing this in the mid 90’s. Sandy Alderson, Oakland GM in the mid-90’s and GM before Beane believed that evaluating players was better done through looking at the stats, rather than what “baseball men” said. (Lewis, 56)
Managers tended to discuss batting average when talking about runs scored. Conventional wisdom would have it that average and runs would be correlated. Alderson looked into this, and found that runs and average had no correlation, but rather they were more correlated with on-base percentage. (Lewis, 57)
Stats from the 1999-2002 seasons seem to prove that Alderson is wrong, Oakland aside, and that Steven Levitt, author of Freakonomics, was right, that Oakland is winning because they have their talent cheap, they’re not doing anything special. Here are the averages (AVG), on-base percentages (OBP), slugging percentages (SLG), and walks (BB) of the 5 most potent offenses (in terms of runs scored) compared with Oakland:
1999 (MLB ranks in OBP and AVG parentheses)
R… BB… OBP… SLG… AVG
1. Cleveland Indians 1009 743 .374 (1) .467 .289 (2)
2. Texas Rangers 945 611 .361 (4) .479 .293 (1)
3. Arizona Diamondbacks 908 588 .347 (15) .459 .277 (10)
4. Colorado Rockies 906 508 .348 (13) .472 .288 (3)
5. New York Yankees 900 718 .366 (2) .453 .282 (5)
6. Oakland Athletics 893 770 .355 (7) .446 .259 (26)
2000
R… BB… OBP… SLG… AVG
1. Chicago White Sox 978 591 .356 (7) .470 .286 (4)
2. Colorado Rockies 968 601 .362 (2) .455 .294 (1)
3. Cleveland Indians 950 685 .367 (1) .470 .288 (2)
4. Oakland Athletics 947 750 .360 (6) .458 .270 (16)
5. Houston Astros 938 673 .361 (4) .477 .278 (7)
6. San Francisco Giants 925 709 .362 (3) .472 .278 (8)
2001
R… BB… OBP… SLG… AVG
1. Seattle Mariners 927 614 .360 (1) .445 .288 (2)
2. Colorado Rockies 923 511 .354 (2) .483 .292 (1)
3. Cleveland Indians 897 577 .350 (3) .458 .278 (3)
4. Texas Rangers 890 548 .344 (6) .471 .275 (4)
5. Oakland Athletics 884 640 .345 (5) .439 .264 (15)
6. Houston Astros 847 581 .347 (4) .451 .271 (6)
2002
R… BB… OBP… SLG… AVG
1. New York Yankees 897 640 .354 (1) .455 .275 (3)
2. Boston Red Sox 859 545 .345 (4) .444 .277 (2)
3. Chicago White Sox 856 555 .338 (9) .449 .268 (8)
4. Anaheim Angels 851 462 .341 (6) .433 .282 (1)
5. Texas Rangers 843 554 .338 (12) .455 .269 (7)
9. Oakland Athletics 800 609 .339 (7) .432 .261 (16)
Levitt claims in his book that conventional wisdom is wrong. Yet conventional wisdom seems to prevail in this case. “X can cause Y, Y can cause X, or it may be some other factor is causing both X and Y.” (Levitt, p. 163) Note that aside from Oakland, the most potent offenses during this time had batting averages among the top 10 in the league. How is Oakland seemingly defying conventional wisdom and having such a potent offense? The answer perhaps is element Z: base-running.
Part of Oakland’s offensive philosophy was that stealing bases was luck. They therefore discouraged it, not wanting to run themselves out of innings. From 1999-2002, their ranks in stolen bases were 28, 30, 24, and 30. Their ranks in times thrown out trying to steal, or caught stealing those 4 years were 28, 30, 30, and 29. This is perhaps the major reason, in addition to others, why Oakland seemed to defy logic. They were being efficient on the bases, getting these runners on base to home plate, not getting thrown out on the bases.
Perhaps what best exemplifies this is what happened following the 2001 season. They had lost Johnny Damon and Jason Gaimbi on offense to free agency that winter. Their DH, Olmedo Saenz, was headed to the bench. So they had 3 holes to fill. The average OBP of these 3 players was .364, 30 points above the league average. So they needed 3 players who between them could get on base at this rate. (Lewis, 141)
The A’s brass was shocked at the cheap cost of these players who had a high penchant for getting on base. To be able to get these players, they had to give up other qualities, such as speed, which they didn’t value anyways, as evidenced by their relatively speaking low stolen base attempts.
Scott Hatteberg, David Justice, and Jason Gaimbi’s younger brother, Jeremy were signed or promoted from within the organization to fill these vacancies. The rest of MLB had viewed them as useless, but Oakland didn’t, allowing them to get the players cheap. (Lewis, 142) To fill Damon’s vacancy in the lead-off hole, they put Jeremy Gaimbi in there.
To most people, the one thing wanted from a lead-off hitter is speed. Gaimbi had no speed. As Art Howe put it once, he’s “the only manager in baseball who has to pinch-run for his lead-off man.” (Lewis, 158) But Gaimbi was in the lead-off hole because of his high OBP.
So the question comes down to this: How did Oakland find this glitch in the market when the numbers show other potent offenses from this time were among league leaders in OBP? Perhaps the answer is in the other traits of the players these teams had.
Jim Thome, Manny Ramirez, Steve Finley, Matt Williams, Alex Rodriguez, Frank Thomas, Jeff Bagwell, Craig Biggio, Derek Jeter, Todd Helton, Larry Walker, Ivan Rodriguez, Barry Bonds, Ichiro Suzuki, and Jason Gaimbi (in 2002) are some of the players associated with these teams with the potent offenses.
When fans and managers around the game think of them, they see these guys as players with speed, players with power. They don’t see the OBP. Take Gaimbi for example. Oakland liked him because he got on base. But the rest of baseball didn’t see him that way. They saw him as a guy who is going to hit 30-40 home runs, knock in 100-120 runs a season.
It just so happened that all these players did have high OBP, but that it was secondary because they had the attributes everyone else thought was what was needed for success. In Oakland’s eyes, OBP was primary. Speed and power were secondary.
Because the guys with the speed and the guys with the power were the types of players Oakland could not afford, they had to settle on these guys who were never supposed to have a chance, because they didn’t have power or speed.
In conclusion, Levitt and Lewis were both correct to an extent. Oakland did win with cheap talent and good pitching that was also cheap, as Levitt claims, but it turns out that they also won by placing high value on OBP, as Lewis claims. It was the way Oakland used OBP that led them to get the talent cheap.
Sources:
Mlb.com, historical team stats tracker
Lewis, Michael. Moneyball, the Art of Winning an Unfair Game, W.W. Norton and Company, copyright 2003 by Michael Lewis
Levitt, Steven D. “Will the real Billy Beane please stand up!?,” Freakonomics Authors’ Blog
http://www.freakonomics.com/blog/2005/04/23/will-the-real-billy-beane-please-stand-up
